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Abstract: Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prediction market prices weakly
aggregate the disparate information of the traders about states (moves) of nature. However, in
many practical applications one might want to predict the move of a strategic participant. This
is particularly important in aggressor‐defender contests. This paper reports a set of such
experiments where the defender may have the advantage of observing a prediction market on
the aggressor’s action. The results of the experiments indicate that: the use of prediction
markets does not increase the defender’s win rate; prediction markets contain reliable
information regarding aggressors’ decisions, namely excess bid information, that is not being
exploited by defenders; and the existence of a prediction market alters the behavior of the
aggressor whose behavior is being forecast.
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1. Introduction
Prediction markets have gained popularity in recent years as a means of aggregating diversely
held information. Chen and Plott (2002) implement prediction markets for sales forecasts at
Hewlett‐Packard Corporation (HP) and report that these markets outperform more traditional
statistical forecasts. Cowgill et al. (2009) document that internal prediction markets at Google
perform well for forecasting new office openings, launch dates, etc. Other effective prediction
markets include those for movie box office receipts (Pennock et al. 2001), election outcomes
(Berg et al. 2003), outbreaks of contagious diseases (Polgreen et al. 2007) and slaughtered
cattle (Gallardo 2009). Still there remain many more applications where prediction markets
could be utilized, but are not (see Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). For example, Hahn and Tetlock
(2005) propose using prediction markets to set monetary policy. After the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2011, Policy Analysis Markets (PAM) were proposed by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, but these markets were not implemented due to concerns raised by
members of Congress (Pearlstein 2003; Wyden and Dorgan 2003).
A common, but generally inaccurate, concern for prediction markets is that they can be
easily manipulated (see Deck and Porter (2013) for a review). Deck et al. (2013) demonstrate
that prediction markets can be manipulated when traders only get returns from manipulation
and have a large bankroll. The other main concern in many countries including the United
States involves the ambiguous legal status of prediction markets, due to resemblance with
gambling. Prior to halting operations in March 2013, Intrade.com operated public prediction
markets on a wide range of future events, including politics, economics, and entertainment, but
had spun off the now defunct TradeSports.com which focused exclusively of forecasting the
outcome of sporting events years earlier. In Arrow et al. (2008) a group of 22 prominent
scholars called for government policies, especially gambling laws, to be relaxed in order for
decision makers to better utilize prediction markets.
Concerns of manipulation and gambling are largely mitigated with internal prediction
markets, where only members within an organization can participate using token money given
to them (as opposed to Intrade where the general public traded shares using money out of
their own pockets). The markets at HP were only open to employees in the fields of marketing
and finance (Chen and Plott 2002). The proposed PAM markets were to be open only to those
inside the defense community. Trades on Google’s internal market are denoted in Goobles
(Cowgill 2009). Absent these two main concerns, it is easy to see why there are many
advocates for increased reliance on prediction markets given their demonstrated success in a
variety of settings (see for Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004).
Despite the rhetoric around prediction market success, these markets are typically quite
noisy in the laboratory. As discussed in a recent survey by Deck and Porter (2013), average
1

prices in a period tend to be too high and over a series of trading periods the variance in
average prices tends to be too small in comparison to full information aggregation prediction.
Nonetheless, closing prices contain useful information as they correlate positively – although
weakly – with the prices that should prevail when information is aggregated, at least after the
traders have gained market experience. Even such imperfect prediction markets can provide
useful information to market observers (see Oprea et al. 2007). However, unlike previous
laboratory experiments where the forecasted event is exogenous, in many naturally occurring
settings the activity that is being forecasted involves strategic uncertainty in a larger game. For
example, one can imagine a firm using a prediction market to forecast which market segments
a rival is going to target with its advertising budget. The goal is not simply to aggregate this
information, but to use the information in allocating the firm’s own advertising budget. The
same situation would have arisen in the PAM markets where the forecasted activity would have
involved the calculated actions of terrorists who were attempting to hide their actions from
those in the defense community.
Endogeneity raises two issues for prediction markets that are absent with exogenous
information. The first is that the type of behavior that is being forecast may change due to the
existence of the prediction market. The second is that traders may be more likely to rely upon
their own intuition or bias about what the forecasted behavior is likely to be rather than
focusing on their private information. For example, a trader forecasting a rival’s advertising
efforts in a particular market may be subject to a confirmation bias and overweight their prior
belief that the rival is going to invest heavily on a certain market segment. A defense analyst
may ignore private information suggesting one target is unlikely to be attacked out of a
conviction that it is the obvious choice of target.
The current paper explores the effectiveness of internal prediction markets where the
forecasted event is an endogenous choice in a game between the market observer and the
party whose actions are being forecasted. Formally, the game is modeled as a weak‐link
contest, a type of game that has received considerable behavioral and theoretical attention
recently (see Dechenaux et al. 2012 and Kovenock and Roberson 2010 for comprehensive
reviews of the respective literatures). The paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses background details. Section 3 describes the experimental design and Section 4
provides the behavioral results. A final section offers a concluding discussion.
2. Background
Contests have been used to study a variety of topics: lobbying (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 1980;
and Synder 1989), patent races (Fudenberg et al., 1983; Haris and Vickers, 1985, 1987), and
military strategy (Borel, 1921; Borel and Ville, 1938; Gross, 1950; Gross and Wagner, 1950 and
Freidman, 1958). The essential components of a contest are that each player makes an
2

unrecoverable investment in the hopes of earning a prize, the allocation of which depends in
part on the set of realized investments. One common approach is the so called all‐pay auction
where the party investing (or bidding) more wins with certainty.
Conceptually it is straightforward to extend a single all‐pay auction to a series of
contests where the ultimate winner depends on combinations of outcome of the individual
contests. Many sporting champions are determined by playing a best of five or best of seven
series. New products often involve a series of patents rather than a single patent. Firms often
compete with each other in multiple markets. Terrorists have many possible targets. The
classic Colonel Blotto game (Borel 1921) is a multi‐contest game where the two militaries
simultaneously allocate discrete numbers of soldiers among different battlefields. A battle is
won by the military with more troops present and the war is won by the military that wins the
most battles. Despite the relatively simple set up, this problem is quite complex and only finally
solved for all symmetric discrete Colonel Blotto games by Hart (2008). Other recent work in the
area has allowed for asymmetric budget, an opportunity cost of resources, continuous
investment, and non‐majority win rules (see Kvasov, 2007; Laslier, 2002; Laslier and Picard,
2002; Roberson, 2006; Szentes and Rosenthal 2003a, b). Clark and Konrad (2007) and Golman
and Page (2009) consider a weakest link structure where one side needs to win every battle to
win the war while the other side only needs a single victory.
In the laboratory, Avrahami and Kareev (2009) examine Colonel Blotto games with
symmetric and asymmetric budgets. The results are qualitatively consistent with the
theoretical predictions. Cinar and Goksel (2012) also report aggregate behavior in Blotto games
that is consistent with the theoretical predictions (see also Arad 2012; Arad and Rubinstein
2012; Chowdhury, et al. 2013).
What has not received much attention in the contest literature is sequential all pay
auctions, weak link or otherwise. The reason is that the solution is obvious and favors the last
mover. However, if a successful prediction market that was completely aggregating
information were in operation, the simultaneous move game would essentially become an
uninteresting sequential game that could be dominated by the contestant who observed the
prediction. Thus, these types of contests are exactly where one would want to implement a
prediction market. Further, given the clear effect a functioning prediction market should have,
this is an ideal environment for exploring prediction markets for endogenous actions.
Another advantage of the discrete weak‐link contest for the purpose of this paper is that
the strategy space lends itself well to the types of exogenous environments that have been
used to study prediction markets. The classic information aggregation experiment by Plott and
Sunder (1988) involved three possible states of the world where each traders was informed of
one of the unrealized states in such a way that the market as a whole had complete
3

information. Anderson and Holt (1997) and Hung and Plott (2001) consider a world with only
two states; but in which traders only observe a noisy signal of the realized state. With only two
possible states a single state specific asset can capture all of the relevant information. Again
the behavioral results were that prices do a reasonable job of aggregating information. The
reported success of prediction markets should not be construed to mean that prices are
typically correct in the laboratory (see Manski 2006 and Gjerstad 2005 for a theoretical
discussion of the divergence in beliefs and equilibrium prices). In the lab, prices are often too
high but absent active manipulation market observers are typically able to take this bias into
account to some degree when interpreting market behavior (Oprea, et al. 2007; Deck, et al.
2013). Given the previous success and the operational simplicity of prediction markets with
only two states as in Anderson and Holt (1997) and Hung and Plott (2001), the contest used in
the current paper is restricted to two battlefields. Following Plott and Sunder (1988), the
market participants as a whole have complete information, which is achieved by each trader in
the market observing one of the discrete units that the player whose actions are being
forecasted has to available to allocate.
3. Experimental Design
The experiment involves two interconnected pieces drawing from the background literature
discussed above: a contest game and a prediction market. These two components are
described in detail separately and then the specific treatments and procedures that were used
are presented.
3.1 Weak‐Link Contest Setup
One player (the aggressor) has a budget of 5 tokens to allocate discretely between two
contests, A and B. The other player (the defender) has 6 tokens to allocate between the two
contests. In each contest, whoever invests the most wins, and ties are broken in favor of the
defender. However, the defender must win both contests to claim a prize P2, while the
aggressor only need to win one contest to claim a prize P1. Table 1 gives the normal form
representation of the game. Since there is no opportunity cost associated with the tokens,
each player will always bid her entire endowment and thus strategies are completely identified
by the number of tokens bid on A. During the experiment, neutral terms such as first mover
and second mover were used instead of aggressor and defender.1
The game shown in Table 1 can be thought of as an advertising game between a smaller
new entrant (the aggressor) and a larger incumbent (the defender). Both firms can buy air time
for commercials targeted to different customer segments where each segment will purchase
1

The contest is a simultaneous play game. The reason for having sequential names is discussed below.
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from the firm that courts it more. In such a case it is reasonable to assume that the incumbent
has some small brand awareness by nature of having been in the market previously and would
thus win a tie. Here P1 can be thought of as the benefit to the new entrant from capturing one
of the market segments whereas P2 can be viewed as the marginal benefit to the incumbent of
serving both segments rather than one. Alternatively, the game in Table 1 can be thought of as
being played between a group of suicide bombers (the aggressor) and the police (the
defender). The terrorists are successful if they can blow up either of two targets, which they
can do if they outnumber the police at that location.
Table 1. Normal Form Game Representation of Strategic Contest

Tokens
Invested in
Contest A by
Aggressor

0
1
2
3
4
5

0
(0,P2)
(P1,0)
(P1,0)
(P1,0)
(P1,0)
(P1,0)

Tokens Invested in Contest A by Defender
1
2
3
4
5
(0,P2) (P1,0) (P1,0) (P1,0) (P1,0)
(0,P2) (0,P2) (P1,0) (P1,0) (P1,0)
(P1,0) (0,P2) (0,P2) (P1,0) (P1,0)
(P1,0) (P1,0) (0,P2) (0,P2) (P1,0)
(P1,0) (P1,0) (P1,0) (0,P2) (0,P2)
(P1,0) (P1,0) (P1,0) (P1,0) (0,P2)
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(P1,0)
(P1,0)
(P1,0)
(P1,0)
(P1,0)
(0,P2)

Table entries are (Profit to the Aggressor, Profit to the Defender)

By design, the weak‐link structure of the contest described in Table 1 is such that the
aggressor has a distinct advantage. While there are multiple mixed strategy Nash equilibria for
this simultaneous move game (and no pure strategy equilibrium), each one is such that the
aggressor should win with two‐thirds probability and the defender should win with one‐third
probability. If however, the defender could observe the action of the aggressor, then the
defender would always be able to win the game. Thus, this game provides a setting where a
successful prediction market should have a dramatic effect. As a final point on the contest, the
structure of the game is such that even in a repeated play setting there is no opportunity for
cooperation and no higher expected payoff can be achieved beyond that of the repeated play
of the stage game equilibrium.
3.2 Prediction Market Setup
A market consists of five traders, each endowed with 500 lab cents, the market’s currency.
Every trader observes a distinct token that the aggressor allocated in either A or B, thus
collectively the five traders know the total number of A tokens out of a possible five the
aggressor invested in A. Traders can buy and sell shares whose value in lab cents is equal to the
percentage of A tokens that are observed (that is a share is worth the number of tokens
invested in A by the aggressor / 5 x 100). Traders buy and sell shares via a double auction
5

market for two minutes. A trader is not endowed with shares, but can hold a short position so
long as his cash endowment is sufficiently large to cover the maximum possible value of the
share.2
3.3 Treatments and Procedures
To explore the impact of prediction markets on decisions of contestants, we conducted two
main treatments of contests with and without prediction markets, referred to as “No Market”
and “With Market”. All sessions were completed at the Economic Science Institute at Chapman
University. Subjects, none of whom had participated in any related studies, were drawn from a
database of undergraduate volunteers.
In the “No Market” treatment, six fixed pairs of subjects completed the simultaneous
version of the contest game described above.3 To maintain anonymity among subjects, several
pairs participated the experiment at the same time. Each pair played the contest 23 times,
including three practice rounds and 20 salient rounds with P1 = P2 = $2. As demonstrated by
Chowdhury et al. (2013), the fixed matching protocol leads to mixing behavior that is more
consistent with theoretical prediction in Blotto style games. After each contest, both players
were informed of the rival’s action as well as the outcome. Subjects for this treatment were
recruited for one hour. At the end of the experiment, contestant were privately paid their
cumulative earnings in cash and dismissed from the experiment. A copy of the instructions for
the contest game is included in the appendix.
The “With Market” also had six fixed aggressor – defender pairs playing the contest
game. The first mover aggressor made her decision, then the traders in the prediction market
each received a signal identifying a distinct token invested by the aggressor. Before making her
own decision, the second mover defender could not observe aggressor’s decision but could
observe trading in the prediction market.4
Exogenous vs Endogenous Markets: Prior to the start of the contest, traders went
through a sequence of ten trading markets where the number of A tokens was exogenously
2

Deck, et al. (2013) demonstrate by comparison to Oprea, et al. (2007) that this procedure as opposed to
providing an endowment of shares does not impact market performance in similar settings.
3
Strictly speaking the actions were sequential, but the first mover aggressor’s actions were kept hidden from the
second mover defender so there was no information revelation. This was done because the other two treatments
required contests decisions be made sequentially so that defenders could observe the market activity of the
informed traders.
4
In the with market treatment, each aggressor – defender pair experienced both private markets, observed only
by the defender, and public markets, observed by both the defender and the attacker. The order of the public and
private periods was blocked to control for order effects. Ultimately, the observability of the market did not impact
behavior and in the results that are presented in the next section data from both types of markets are combined.
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determined. Thus, this portion of the experiment can be directly compared to other prediction
market experiments, although it does mean that the results for markets predicting endogenous
behavior are conditioned on having experienced traders in the markets something that is
expected to facilitate information aggregation. Prior to the thirty planned markets (10 with
exogenous token determination and 20 with endogenous determination) subjects were given
instructions (a copy of which is included in the appendix), completed a comprehension quiz,
and participated in an unpaid practice market. The subjects in a market interacted with each
other every period, as is typical in market experiments. Further, each group of five traders was
always connected to the same fixed aggressor – defender pair in the endogenous periods, but
there were always multiple groups running concurrently to maintain anonymity. This type of
familiarity between the traders and defender is reflective of naturally occurring internal
prediction markets.
Contestants Experience Markets: The subjects who would serve as the contestants in
these sessions also went through the market directions, practice period and the ten
exogenously determined token allocation trading periods so that they would better understand
the market feedback during the endogenous periods. In fact, the future contestants did not
know that they would serve as contestants until after the ten initial markets were completed.5
After the last exogenous market all subjects in the session were informed of how the contest
game worked and how the aggressor’s actions would determine the information in the market.
The experimental design is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Treatment Design

Number of Aggressor ‐ Defender Pairs
Prediction Market
Number of Subjects
Number of Periods
Exogenous Markets
Contests

No Market
6
None
12

With Market
6
5 Traders
42

‐
20

10
20 Planned*

Notes: Due to time constraints, sessions with prediction markets lasted either 17 or 19 periods instead of the
planned 20.

5

Care was taken to ensure that an aggressor – defender pair did not participate in the same exogenous single
prediction markets. Given the number of subjects needed for the endogenous prediction market portion of the
session, the future contestants traded in markets with only 3 active traders during the exogenous markets phase of
the session. These participants were informed that there were only three active traders in their market and that
one of the inactive traders was given an A token and the other was given a B token so that the active traders as a
whole still held complete information in a five token environment.
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Subjects in the prediction market sessions were recruited for two and half hours. All
trader earnings were converted into $US at the rate of 500 lab cents = US$1, a rate that was
common knowledge throughout the experiment. At the end of the experiment, subjects were
paid their earnings privately in cash and dismissed from the experiment. The average salient
earnings were $11.63 per hour, which was in addition to a fixed $7 payment for participating.
4. Results
The data consist of choices in 228 contests and 168 prediction markets (see details in Table 2).
Our results are organized around three main questions:
1. Do prediction markets perform differently when private information is exogenously
determined versus when private information reflects strategic decisions?
2. Do prediction markets aid defenders in winning the contest?
3. Do aggressors in contests behave differently when they know there is a prediction market
trading based on their decisions?
4.1 Prediction Market Performance with Exogenous and Endogenous Information
To examine whether prediction markets perform differently when the information is exogenous
or endogenous, we investigate three key outcome variables: the closing price, the excess bids,
and the number of contracts.6 Market closing prices are often used instead of average contract
prices because the trading process gathers and refines information over the course of the
trading period. In the last half of the exogenous token markets, the closing prices and the true
values of the assets averaged 60.6 and 40 respectively, and the correlation between the
average closing and the true asset value was 0.24, consistent with the level of information
aggregation in previous lab experiments (see e.g., Deck et al. 2013).7 Excess bids are defined as
the number of unfulfilled standing bids minus the number of unfulfilled standing asks in a
market period. Previous research has found that this measure contains useful information for
making inference in asset markets (see Smith et al. 1988; Caginalp et al. 2000). In particular,
excess bids indicate buying pressure and thus undervalued assets, while excess asks (i.e., excess
bids being negative) suggest selling pressure and overvalued assets. The third measure is the
number of contracts or trade volume, which is a standard measure of market activity.
6

In some of the markets with endogenous information there were no trades. In these cases the closing price was
taken to be the average of the lowest standing ask and highest standing bid when the market closed. In one
instance there was no standing ask when the market closed and the closing price was calculated based upon an
assumed ask of 100.
7
The substantive results do not change if we focus on average prices instead of closing prices. Across all 168
prediction markets, the correlation between average and closing prices was 0.78. For the exogenous markets the
average average price was 57.6 and the correlation with the true values was 0.36.
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Table 3 reports regressions on each of the three market outcome variables described
above. To control for correlations caused by repeated observations, we cluster at the level of
aggressor‐defender pairs. The first regressor “endogenous” is 1 if the signals received by
traders are based on the actual decisions of the aggressor, and is 0 if signals are exogenously
generated. The second regressor “value” is the true value of the asset.
Result 1. The pricing performance of prediction markets does not depend on whether the
information is generated by strategic human decision makers or determined exogenously, but
trade volume is affected.
Evidence. The first two columns of Table 3 indicate that neither closing prices nor excess bids
are affected by the treatment variable; however the third column indicates that trade volume is
lower when information is endogenous.
As one would expect, value has a positive and significant impact on the closing price –
the more the asset is worth, the greater the price. However, the effect is much smaller than it
would be if closing prices equaled the true asset value (the point estimate would be 1). The
positive slope on Value combined with the positive and significant constant term in the first
regression indicates closing prices tend to be too high on average, particularly when the true
value is low. This is consistent with previous prediction market experiments. The second
regression reveals that the number of excess bids correlates with the true value. When the
value is high, there are more people placing unfulfilled bids whereas when the price is low
there are relatively more unfulfilled offers to sell. This too is consistent with previous
prediction market experiments. The number of contracts, on the other hand, does not vary
with the asset’s value. This finding is important because it indicates that the traders were not
liquidity constrained when the asset value was high. The third regression also reveals that the
markets are fairly active although they are more active with exogenous information.
Table 3. Performance of Prediction Market

Endogenous
Value
Constant
R2
Observations

Closing Price
‐9.921
(5.308)
0.243**
(0.081)
51.587**
(3.915)
0.186
168

Excess Bids
‐0.805
(0.933)
0.051***
(0.013)
‐2.645*
(1.274)
0.191
168

Contracts
‐3.032**
(1.068)
‐0.009
(0.011)
12.345***
(2.259)
0.049
168

In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the session level. *, ** and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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4.2 The Usefulness of Prediction Markets for Defenders
If Defenders are using the prediction market successfully it should improve the win rate over
the case in which there is no prediction market available to them. This does not occur.
Result 2. Having access to a prediction market does not improve defender’s chance of winning.
Evidence. In the absence of a prediction market, the defenders won 39% of the contests
(n=120), similar to the predicted one third win rate (p‐value = 0.36, two sided proportion test).
In comparison, when defenders have access to a prediction market, their win rate did not
improve: 38% (p‐value = 0.88, two sided proportion test). Had the prediction markets provided
perfect information and defenders fully taken advantage of this information, then defenders
should be winning 100% of the time in the “with market” treatment.
The lack of change in defender win rates indicates they were not able to use the
prediction markets to improve their chance of winning. This could be driven by two factors: 1)
the markets may not have aggregated information and 2) the defenders may not have been
able to decipher the information from the market and use it accordingly. Therefore, we next
turn our attention to the analysis of prediction markets.
Figure 1 details each aggressor‐defender pair in the prediction market treatments. This
figure highlights the heterogeneity in aggressor play, which is captured by the asset value after
the initial 10 exogenous value periods (shown as × in the figure). In two of the sessions
(sessions 4 and 5) the aggressor always invests all of his tokens in single target. In these cases
the prediction markets appear to work well, as shown by the solid lines representing closing
market prices. Of course, this performance could be facilitated by traders learning that the
aggressors only take extreme actions. In the other cases where the aggressors occasionally split
their tokens, interpreting what is happening in the prediction market is more difficult. Figure 1
also shows the actions of the defender. Given the structure of the game, the defender wins if
he has the same number of A tokens as the aggressor or one more A token than the aggressor.
Thus, there are two choices by the aggressor for which the defender could win given the
defender’s choice – essentially these are the defender’s guesses about the aggressor’s action.
These choices are denoted by □ in the figure with the top one being the number of A tokens
selected by the defender. If the defender won a particular contest the × will appear inside the
□. If the aggressor won then × will not appear inside the □. As an example, consider the last
period in session 4 (the top right of the Figure 1). In this period the aggressor selected 5 A
tokens and thus the share value was 100. The closing price was 90 and as a result the defender
selected 5 A tokens. The defender won this contest.

10

Figure 1. Prediction Markets: Asset Value, Aggressor’s A Tokens, Closing Prices,
and Defender’s Guess of Aggressor Behavior
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Table 4 provides two sets of additional regression results designed to evaluate market and
defender performance. The first looks at the degree to which the market provides useful
information about the behavior of aggressors. That is, the estimation indicates what market
information, if any, a defender should use to make inference about an aggressor’s actions. The
second regression in Table 4 reveals the market information that defenders actually use to
make their decisions when a prediction market is in operation. Trade volume is omitted from
these specifications because the results of Table 3 indicate there is no relationship between
asset value and the number of contracts. The econometric results lead to the following.
Result 3. Prediction markets contain reliable information regarding Aggressor’s decisions, but
defenders fail to fully extract the information. Specifically, while Defenders correctly anticipate
that closing prices are correlated with Aggressor behavior, Defenders fail to recognize that
excess bids are as well.
Evidence. The estimation reported in Table 4 indicates that both closing price and excess bids
provide information to the defender, consistent with previous prediction market experiments.
However, it turns out that defenders are using closing price, but they are ignoring the
information in excess bids at their own peril. Combined with the lack of an effect for the source
of the information (see Table 3) and the similarity of our exogenous prediction markets and
others in the literature, the regression results in Table 4 suggest that the failure of the
prediction markets to help defenders lies at least partially with the ability of the defenders to
interpret the prediction markets.
Table 4. Prediction Market Information that Defenders Should and Do Use

Dependent Variable
Closing Price
Excess Bids
Constant
R2
Observations

Should Use
Number of Tokens
Aggressor Invested in A
0.026***
(0.006)
0.178***
(0.033)
1.171**
(0.351)
0.438
108

Actually Use
Number of Tokens
Defender Invested in A
0.018*
(0.008)
‐0.061
(0.035)
2.096***
(0.531)
0.051
108

Standard errors, shown in parentheses are clustered at the session level. *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.

Result 3 reveals that, when used optimally, the prediction market would have increased
defender win rates above the observed 38%. Had the defenders used the estimation from the
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first column of Table 4 to forecast aggressor behavior and responded accordingly, their win rate
would have reached 51%. While this is still well below the 100% that would have been
obtained from a perfectly functioning prediction market, this represents a marginally significant
improvement (based on permutations test of difference between observed and potential win
rates by individual defenders, p‐value = 0.094).
4.3 The Impact of Prediction Markets on Aggressor Strategy
Another potential impact of the existence of prediction markets is on the behavior of
aggressors. Knowing that their behavior will be revealed to traders and potentially relayed to
defenders could lead aggressors to behave differently.
Result 4. The presence of a prediction market alters the behavior of the Aggressors.
Evidence. Figure 2 shows the behavior of aggressors by treatment taking into account the
symmetry in the game.8 Because the defender has an extra token and wins ties, investing 0 or
6 tokens in A is a dominated strategy for the defender. Figure 2 indicates that defenders
understood this and almost always avoided placing all of their tokens in one place. The data
indicate that markets actually lead aggressors to make significantly more extreme attacks, with
increased weight on 0 or 5 tokens being invested in A (p‐value = 0.01, two‐sided proportion test
between treatments for frequency of investing 0 or 5 in A). The change in aggressor behavior is
met with a change in defender behavior. Defenders in the treatment with prediction markets
respond by investing 1 or 5 tokens in A to defend against these more extreme attacks (p‐value =
0.01, two‐sided proportion test between treatments applied on frequency of investing 1 or 5 in
A).
Figure 2. Contest Decisions by Treatment

8

Examining disaggregated data leads to the same general conclusions and supports that play is basically symmetric
about the mean number of tokens although defenders without a prediction market are more likely to invest 4
tokens in A than 2 tokens in A.
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5. Discussion
Prediction markets are becoming a broadly accepted tool for aggregating disparate pieces of
information. Such markets have been used to predict a wide range of future outcomes, from
the probability of extra‐terrestrials making contact with earthlings (on Intrade.com) to the
likelihood that a Hollywood movie set to be released years in the future will be a success (on
HSX.com). These markets are also used by business for far more mundane forecasts of market
conditions and rival behavior, which are then used to make strategic choices for the firm.
However, much of the academic research investigating prediction markets has relied upon
studies where the information being forecasted is exogenously determined.
In this paper we report the results of a series of controlled laboratory experiments in which
players are competing in a strategic weak‐link styled contest. Absent a prediction market, the
contest is designed to heavily favor one of the players and this pattern is indeed what we
observe behaviorally. However, a successful prediction market should turn the tide in favor of
the other player. Ultimately, we do not find evidence that the disadvantaged player was able
to use the prediction market to gain the upper hand. This failure appears to be at least partly
due to the contestants not making full use of the information in the markets, specifically
information contained in excess bids.
Our results demonstrate three important aspects of using prediction markets to forecast
endogenously created strategically valuable information. The first is that the existence of a
prediction market can alter the behavior being forecasted. Such a phenomenon could be
particularly problematic if the traders are familiar with the strategic setting and overweight
historical information that may no longer be relevant. The second insight of this paper is that
market performance in terms of prices and excess bids is similar when the predicted
information is exogenous versus when it is endogenous. This result is important because it
suggests that the market incentives can be sufficient to help traders focus on their actual
information rather than trading on their prior beliefs. The third highlight of our results is that
while prices in prediction markets contain information, decision makers may ignore other
information from the market at their own peril. Our study also adds to growing evidence that
excess bids are an important source of information in prediction markets. Ceteris paribus, the
more unfulfilled bids in the market the greater the forecast should be adjusted up from the
price with the reverse holding for excess asks.
Our work demonstrates that the creation of a prediction market is not a panacea. Having a
prediction market is not sufficient for decision makers to make good choices: what to take
from a prediction market is not self‐evident. Consumers of prediction market information need
to be sufficiently sophisticated and trained to be able to fully exploit the advantages of having
such markets. Of course, contestants who know they are facing more sophisticated rivals may
14

further adjust their own behavior which could in turn influence market performance. We
believe that this is an important avenue for future research as more and more organizations
begin to implement prediction markets as inputs to important strategic decisions.
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Appendix: Subject Instructions
Text of Directions for Contest with No Prediction Market

Page 1.
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. You will be paid in cash at the end of the
experiment based upon your decisions, so it is important that you understand the directions completely.
Therefore, if you have a question at any point, please raise your hand and someone will assist you.
Otherwise we ask that you do not talk or communicate in any other way with anyone else. If you do,
you may be asked to leave the experiment and will forfeit any payment.

Page 2.
The experiment is broken into a series of rounds. Each round you can earn $2 dollars. At the end of the
experiment you will be paid your cumulative earnings.
You will be randomly and anonymously matched with someone else in the experiment and will interact
with that person every round. Each round, one of you will earn $2 and the other will earn $0. The
process used to determine who earns the money in a round is described on the following pages.

Page 3.
There are two items available each round: item A and item B.
There are also two types of people in this activity: First Movers and Second Movers. You will be a First
(Second) Mover, but it is important that you understand both roles.
First Movers earn $2 if they claim either item A or item B. Second Movers have to claim both item A and
item B to earn $2.
To claim an item each person places a bid on the item using their tokens for that round. Whoever bids
more tokens for an item claims it. There is no cost for the tokens and both people must use all of their
tokens each round.
First Movers have 5 tokens and Second Movers have 6 tokens. Bids must be in integer amounts, but the
Second Mover has an additional 0.5 tokens automatically bid on each item so a tie can never occur.
Your role, the number of tokens and the amount of money available is the same every round. No
participant knows how many rounds there will be nor will anyone ever know with whom they were
interacting.
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Page 4.
Here is an example of how bidding in a round might look.
Suppose the First Mover places a bid of 4 for item A and 1 for item B.
If the Second Mover places a bid of 5 for item A and 1 for item B, then the Second Mover’s total bid for
item A is 5.5 and 1.5 for item B. In this case, the Second Mover claims both items and thus the Second
Mover earns $2 while the First Mover earns $0.
If instead the Second Mover places a bid of 6 for item A and 0 for item B, then the Second Mover’s total
bid for item A is 6.5 and 0.5 for item B. In this case, the Second Mover claims item A, but the First
Mover claims item B and thus the First Mover earns $2 while the Second Mover earns $0.
Alternatively, if instead the Second Mover places a bid of 3 for item A and 3 for item B, then the Second
Mover’s total bid for item A is 3.5 and 3.5 for item B. In this case, the Second Mover claims item B, but
the First Mover claims item A and thus the First Mover earns $2 while the Second Mover earns $0.

Page 5.
First Movers make their decisions before Second Movers do, but Second Movers do not observe the
choices of the First Mover prior to making their own decisions. After each round, you will observe the
amount each person bid for each item and your earnings for the round.

Page 6
To summarize
You have been assigned the role of First (Second) Mover and will retain that role throughout the
experiment.
Each round you or the person you are matched with will earn $2.
First Movers must claim either item A or item B to earn the money
Second Movers must claim both item A and item B to earn the money
Items are claimed by bidding tokens and whoever bids the most tokens for an item claims it.
First Movers have 5 tokens and Second Movers have 6 tokens plus an extra 0.5 tokens for each
item.
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Directions for Trading Markets
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